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Financing Sustainability: The New Transnational Governance of
Socially Responsible Investment

Benjamin J. Richardson

I.

1.

GOVER N ING THE SO CI A LLY RE SP ONSI BLE IN VE ST M ENT

( SR I)

MAR K ET

Introduction

The surge in transnational investment in recent decades presents new and unusual
challenges to international environmental law. Financial markets are not a collection of
disparate national financial systems. Rather, they function increasingly within a single
global marketplace.1 At the same time, financial regulation remains a product of national
laws, mostly designed to facilitate, rather than hinder, global financial flows.2 Apart
from the European Union (EU), inter-governmental supervision of these Flows is largely
at a nascent stage of evolution.3 International law typically speaks to the behaviour and
responsibilities of states and not to institutional investors and other corporate entities. The
result is a transnational financial system ‘in which money traverses national capital markets
with dramatic speed and callous scrutiny, bringing with it both the ability to enhance local
economic opportunities or break an economy at its very core.’4

Transnational financial markets are also significant to the environment because
they transform money by scale, time, and location into an instrument of
development. One possible reaction to social and environmental impacts of capital
markets is the emergence of new standards for SRI. In the absence of formal
international law outlining environmental rules, a variety of voluntary and other
soft law mechanisms have arisen to encourage banks and other financiers to invest

ethically and sustainably. These mechanisms
Principles

of

include

the

United

Nations

Responsible Investment, the Equator Principles, and other like

standards.5
SRI, which is also known as ethical investment or sustainable finance, depending on its
focus, considers social, environmental, and ethical consequences in the provision of capital to
companies. By targeting entities that financially sponsor investments, in comparison to frontline companies that extract, consume, and pollute, SRI promises a novel way to achieve
sustainability. Sustainability, as a higher-order social goal, concerns the integrity of natural
systems (global climate, evolutionary viability of ecosystems, and other vital life-support
services) and societal and economic issues (health, human rights, poverty, and so on).6
Responsible investment challenges the traditional conceptualization of financial markets
as essentially amoral and driven only by economic rationality. Beginning in the 1700s,
religious groups led by the Quakers began to eschew investments in sin businesses connected
to the slave trade or the production of intoxicants. SRI has since emerged from its ecclesiastical
foundations into a broader coalition for socially and environmentally responsible financing.7
Among its adherents are pension plans interested in sustainable, long-term investment,
specialist ethical mutual funds, and banks that evaluate environmental risks as part of their
lending policies.8 A broad distinction has evolved in SRI between ethical investment, which is
driven by moral imperatives and often a desire for political change, and a less controversial
approach that accommodates social and environmental issues when they present ‘material’
financial risks and opportunities for investors.

Though growing quickly, the SRI sector in its entirety, nonetheless, has captured
only a small market. It likely averages just 3–10 per cent of the investment market
in major economies.9 SRI’s clout is thus limited by its market penetration, but, if it could
become more mainstream, financial markets could arguably contribute significantly
to sustainability. Before this shift can happen, however, reform of financial
markets is necessary to remove various market and institutional barriers to SRI,

such as incentives for short-term financial returns and investors’ ignorance of the
financial impact of corporate environmental performance.
The time has long passed for environmental regulation to target the financial sector. The
domain of environmental law is not intuitively associated with banks, pension funds, and
other financiers since law makers typically only connect environmental problems directly
to companies that extract, consume, and pollute. Yet, corporate financiers should be seen as
the economy’s ‘unseen polluters,’ as they finance activities habitually attributed solely to their
borrowers and investees. Financial sponsorship of environmentally harmful development
should also place corporate financiers within the cupola of responsibility. The biggest
environmental impact of financiers is not their own, direct ecological footprint but, rather,
their indirect impacts from the allocation of capital to other businesses.10 Corporations are
rarely entirely financially self-sufficient and must turn to capital markets for new
investment to fuel growth.11 Financiers, in turn, can gain influence through their ownership
stakes in companies.12 Economic growth and its environmental impacts are thus intertwined
with financial sector decisions.
A proliferation of institutions and new methods for governance of the sector has
contributed to the growth of SRI. These mainly non-state forms of governance are often
organized transnationally and furnish both substantive standards for environmentally
responsible finance and procedures for more transparent, accountable decisions.13 This
ensemble of multilayered and fragmented regulation, with little government input, aims to
promote the SRI market.14 While the use of these mechanisms is mostly voluntary, for
some investors the question is no longer whether to use these mechanisms but which ones to
apply and how.

This article categorizes these mechanisms of SRI governance into four main types.
First, normative
substantive

frameworks

principles

and

provide
guidance

governance
on

through the enunciation of

desirable

performance.

Normative

guidelines include the Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions and the

UN Principles of Responsible Investment.15 Second, process standards that enable the
assessment, verification, and communication of performance are another form of
governance. These standards include the Equator Principles and the Global
Reporting Initiative.16 Third, management systems, such as the International
Organization of Standardization’s ISO 14001 regime, provide integrated or issue
specific frameworks to guide the ongoing management of environmental and social
impacts. Fourth, comparative evaluation mechanisms exist, whereby external entities
evaluate and rank corporate performance for the SRI industry. These rating
mechanisms include SRI stock market indexes, such as the Dow Jones Sustainability
Group Indexes, and SRI think tanks, such as the Social Investment Forum.
These governance mechanisms operate in multi-jurisdictional contexts and financial
institutions that function in global markets.17 Technological

advances and market

deregulation have accelerated the geographical mobility of capital in its search for the
highest returns.18 The globalization of financial services reduces the power of states
individually to regulate financial markets.19 National regulators may also face capacity and
information

deficits

in

supervising

enterprises

engaged

in

complex

trans-border

commerce. Transnational collaboration is also necessary to prevent responsible financiers
from suffering competitive disadvantages.

The rest of this article explains what these major SRI governance mechanisms
demand of financial institutions, assesses their implementation, and makes some
observations about the adequacy of this form of governance for SRI. While
multilateral development banks (MDBs), bilateral foreign aid, and export credit
agencies still play a key role, private financiers have become more significant and
visible. The article does not discuss intergovernmental mechanisms or public
financing. These systems raise separate policy issues, which are discussed in
other literature.20 Nor does it canvass national level reforms for SRI.21 The next

section considers
the theoretical context within which the voluntary-based regulation for

SRI has

emerged, before canvassing the actual mechanisms of SRI governance.
2.

Regulatory Techniques for Governing the Financial Sector

Governance is the decision-making process by which society and organizations are controlled
and coordinated.22 Governance is commonly associated with official regulation, whereby
government

imposes

obligations

or

Concomitantly, in an international

constraints

on

private

sector

behaviour.23

context, governance traditionally requires inter-

governmental cooperation through treaties and other agreements. The weakness of these
understandings of governance based on agency or institution is that a government decision can
become labelled as being regulatory regardless of whether or not it actually discharges
regulatory functions. Conversely, private sector actions can be more influential in controlling
corporate behaviour.
Contemporary governance is increasingly dependent on collaboration between the
state and non-governmental market and civil societal interests.24 In addition, mechanisms
of governance are becoming less coercive and are including more informational and
incentive mechanisms.25 Legal pluralism theory has helped scholars to conceive of
regulation as something more than just the activities of the state.26 Private codes of conduct
and other forms of market-generated accountability programmes are part

of these

heterogeneous or pluralistic systems of modern governance.27 In international law, these
initiatives may be known as ‘soft law.’28 Market-based ordering governance may match the
effectiveness of state regulation,

particularly when firms are concerned about their

reputations and where it helps forestall ‘the less palatable alternative’ of official regulation.29

These changes in governance resonate with ‘reflexive’ forms of regulation. As a
result of the significant functional differentiation in

our social

systems,

mechanisms promoting corporate social responsibility should arguably operate at
the level of specific subsystems (for example, the market).30 Rejecting regulatory
compulsion, Gunther Teubner reasons that legal systems could best change

corporate behaviour by targeting companies’ internal organizational structures. He
explains: ‘[T]he role of law then is not the external control of the firm’s conduct,
but the external mobilisation of internal self-control resources.’31 In contrast to the
supposedly heavy hand of command regulation, which seeks to control behaviour
directly, a system based on reflexive law ‘attempts to create incentives and
procedures that induce entities to act in certain ways and to engage in internal
reflection about what form that behaviour should take . . . the state sets goals, but shares
more of the responsibility for achieving them with regulated entities.’32 For instance,
requirements to disclose, inform, and consult with stakeholders should help make
the practices of companies isomorphic with external public policy demands. More
understanding of the connections between environmental risk and financial risk may
ensue from the reflexive governance of

the financial sector, especially if

environmental concerns are enunciated in a way that is comprehensible to financial
decision makers.33
Reflexive regulation is not just a matter of redesigning government legislation or
international treaties. It can also arise through nongovernmental sources of governance,
such as voluntary codes of conduct developed by businesses. As the next section
explores, voluntary codes may promote reflection and learning and, thereby, encourage a
positive cultural change in the management of subject business.34 They may also, however,
be an excuse to merely tinker marginally with current unsustainable habits and disguise the
continuation of business as usual.
3. Voluntary Standards for SRI

Without sufficient international or national regulation to promote SRI, much will
hinge upon the willingness of financiers to voluntarily promote environmentally
sustainable finance. The voluntary approach, which is often described as corporate
social responsibility (CSR) or business self-regulation, is apparently thriving.35 The

expansion of global commerce and finance has fuelled debate over the appropriate and
legitimate role of the private sector in responding to environmental and social
problems. Industry increasingly participates in discussions concerning social equity
and environmental protection, as both a cause and solution to problems. The
concomitant reframing of private actors, especially transnational companies
(TNCs), from amoral profit-seeking enterprises to ‘corporate citizens,’ has
heightened public expectations of socially responsible behaviour.36
In practice, a company’s adherence to a voluntary code or other mechanism is seldom if
ever purely ‘voluntary,’ in the sense of doing something autonomously and freely for its own
sake. Sometimes, it feels external pressure to act more responsibly.37 Voluntary commitments
may also be rewarding, providing access to technical assistance, financial aid, professional
certification, and public acknowledgement.38 Indeed, ecological modernization theorists
sanguinely believe that, through a framework of industrial modernity, environmental
protection and economic development can be mutually supportive.39 Environmental care,
in this vein, can facilitate efficiency and improve productivity through a less wasteful use of
resources.40 Pressure on financial institutions to heed voluntary standards may arise from
a threat of mandatory regulation, the prospect of adverse publicity, the need to distinguish
themselves in a competitive market, and demands from a local community, customers, or
business associations.41

Whatever the motivations, voluntary standards are ‘voluntary’ to the extent that
authorities do not formally enforce their

adoption.

Further, while adoption of

voluntary codes is not legally obligatory, it may have legal consequences once they
are adopted.42 An industry code or standard may generate legal consequences
through subsequent contracts among participating firms (for example, a loan
covenant between a lender and borrower).
Corporate responses to voluntary standards vary considerably.43 Generally, at one extreme,
companies that actively address environmental issues view escalating pressures on their

business reputation as a strategic opportunity to enhance business value by adopting new
practices beyond the requirements of environmental law. Alternatively, some firms react
negatively, perceiving them as a source of financial risk and liability, which may diminish
shareholder value.
As such, the composition of actors and interests that make up the institutional milieu of a
particular firm and the nature of its stakeholder relationships determine how a firm
conceptualizes challenges to its corporate reputation. For example, a project-lending bank
closely monitored by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may face relatively high
reputational risks from irresponsible financing decisions. Conversely, a pension fund that is
not directly involved in development financing decisions and is insulated from normal
market pressures, may face less societal scrutiny. Therefore, investing in companies with
unsound environmental practices is less risky.
Some scholars and policy makers remain sceptical that voluntary mechanisms provide a
viable means of public policy and doubt their legitimacy as instruments of environmental or
social regulation.44 This criticism has some merit. Various empirical research casts doubt
on

the

effectiveness

of

voluntary

measures

to

significantly

mitigate

corporate

environmental harm.45 For instance, the European Commission recently made emissions
requirements on car manufacturers mandatory because the automobile industry had failed to
meet its own voluntary code of 1998.46 Ideally, voluntary mechanisms create an institutional
context whereby civil society can directly engage with companies and obtain information
about their practices. More commonly, however, voluntary measures lack transparency and
accountability.47 In fact, they may pre-empt regulation and thereby forestall meaningful
change.48 In addition, negotiation and development of voluntary measures carry transaction
costs. Further, there is the perennial danger of free riding, whereby non-participants exploit
the benefits of a voluntary regime without contributing to its costs.49 For example, although
many financial institutions have declined to support China’s Three Gorges Dam project or
Peru’s Camisea natural gas project, some banks did not share these negative views and
stepped in to provide the necessary loans.50 Overall, without careful design and enforcement,

voluntary measures may do little to promote sustainability and become a reprehensible
means to perpetuate business as usual.
I.

NOR M AT I V E FR A M EWOR KS

1.

Introduction

A common governance mechanism for SRI involves codes that are developed by third
parties, which organizations are invited to implement. Third
environmental

NGOs, industry

associations,

parties may include

international technical standardization

bodies, or an inter-governmental entity such as the United Nations.51 The international codes
most relevant to SRI are enumerated in Table 1.52

Apart from the UN norms, none of these codes are formal inter-governmental
initiatives.53 For the two UN Environment Programme (UNEP)-sponsored codes, UNEP
simply coordinates and facilitates the process for businesses and other non-governmental
participants. The following discussion covers only a representative sampling of these
codes, namely those governance approaches that address

SRI

directly

rather than

corporate behaviour generally or that have garnered the most debate in the SRI
community. Consequently, this article does not consider the UN Global
CERES Principles,55 London Principles,56 or the Sullivan Principles.57

Compact,54

2. UNEP’s Finance Initiative (UNEPFI)

The first transnational code specifically for SRI was developed by UNEPFI.58
The finance initiative has become a catalyst for bringing environmental issues to
the attention of global financial markets. Established in 1991 and headquartered
in Geneva, UNEPFI is a public-private partnership.59 It promotes education and
research on SRI and the design of SRI management tools.60 In 1992 it released its
first code, the Statement by Banks on Environment and Sustainable Development,
for banks to manage environmental risks.61 In 1995 UNEPFI sponsored a similar
statement for the insurance industry.62 In May 1997 UNEPFI issued a more general,
umbrella code for all financiers—the Statement by Financial Institutions on the
Environment and Sustainable Development.63 Although the statement is short on
measurable,

concrete

specifics,

it

has

relatively

ambitious

standards

for

environmental risk assessment and public reporting on environmental policy and
practice.64 Commendably, the statement primarily targets the influence that
financiers have over the environmental performance of their borrowers and clients.
Over 200 institutions have signed UNEPFI’s 1997 statement, including commercial
banks, venture capitalists, and asset managers.65
Despite its global reach, the impact of UNEPFI has probably been modest. The lack of
transparency that characterizes the operation of most financiers hinders an assessment of the
extent to which signatories actually meet their commitments. A European survey in 1998 to
monitor implementation of the UNEPFI statements found that the majority of the sixty-three
respondents had a dedicated environmental unit and specific environmental policies and
procedures for corporate credit and project finance. Environmental policies and procedures
were relatively uncommon in the investment banking and insurance sectors.66
Prior to 2000, UNEPFI was a tiny operation employing just two core staff. Apart from
its sustainable finance statements, UNEPFI served mainly to network environmental risk
experts in the financial sector.67 By 2006 UNEPFI had expanded to at least fifteen staff

and taken on more activities. UNEPFI signatories may participate in training and
workshops, taskforce meetings, global roundtables, and themed conferences sponsored by
the initiatives.68 UNEPFI facilitates various working groups to target specific issues69 and
regional taskforces for banks and insurance companies in North America, Asia-Pacific, and
other regions.70 All of these efforts essentially focus on creative ways to improve appreciation
of the links between finance and sustainability.
3. UN Principles of Responsible Investment (UNPRI)

The UNPRI, which was developed under the auspices of UNEP, principally address
institutional investors. They were adopted because the UNEPFI statements, which
focus on banks and insurers, were not considered by the SRI community to provide
an adequate framework for responsible financing in the institutional sector.71 The
UNPRI were drafted by a group of invited investment professionals mainly from the
pension fund sector and were supported by a seventy-person multi-stakeholder
collection of experts from the investment industry, inter-governmental, and
governmental organizations, civil society, and academia. Friends of the Earth (FOE)
and the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) were among the NGOs involved.
UNEP was not formally involved in the drafting of the UNPRI because its
involvement would have required the principles to be developed through a formal
intergovernmental process, which would have been too slow and politically
complicated.72 Therefore, the UNPRI became an industry-led initiative, in which
UNEP simply coordinated and facilitated the negotiations.
The UNPRI is a brief document of six core principles, each of which is illustrated by
thirty-five ‘possible actions’ to achieve them. The principles are:
o

We will incorporate environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG)
issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes.

o

We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership
policies and practices.

o

We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which
we invest.

o

We will promote acceptance and implementation of the principles within
the investment industry.

o

We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the
principles.

o

We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing the
principles.73

The accompanying ‘possible actions’ amount to a ‘best practice’ guide. Concerning the
second principle, for instance, the possible actions specified to achieve active ownership
include ‘exercising voting rights,’ ‘developing an

engagement capability,’ and ‘filing

shareholder resolutions consistent with long-term ESG considerations.’ The principles are
intended for signature by three types of institutions: asset owners (for example, pension funds),
investment managers (intermediaries who manage funds on behalf of others), and professional
service partners (for example, stock exchanges). As of late 2007, approximately 2000
institutions had signed the principles, holding about US $10 trillion in assets under
management.74

Will the UNPRI lead to a fundamental transformation in investor behaviour towards
sustainability? According to the principles’ sponsor, [i]mplementing the Principles will
lead to a more complete understanding of a range of material issues, and this should ultimately
result in increased returns and lower risk. Signatories will be part of a network, which creates
opportunities to pool resources, lowering the costs of research and active ownership practices. The
Principles also allow investors to work together to address a range of systemic problems that, if
remedied, may then lead to more stable, accountable and pro5table market conditions overall.75

As a normative framework for SRI, the principles have some notable shortcomings. For the
first principle, among the list of possible actions, investors are not expected to actually
incorporate ESG factors into their portfolio choices, such as to apply ethical asset selection
screens. The second principle on active ownership focuses on participation in investee

companies while incongruously

ignoring the imperative

of democratizing decision

making within financial institutions themselves.
Unlike some other voluntary codes and standards, the UNPRI do not provide for any
independent audit or verification mechanism to assess the

quality of signatories’

implementation. Nor is there any upfront requirement for a prospective signatory to
demonstrate

any

particular

SRI

performance

standards,

thereby

limiting

their

effectiveness. To sign up, an investor need only e-mail an expression of interest, followed
by a statement of commitment ratified by their governing investor board. The UNPRI
website explains:
There are no legal or regulatory sanctions associated with the Principles. They are designed to be
voluntary and aspirational. There may be reputational risks associated with signing up and then
failing to take any action, but the commitments are, for most signatories, a work in progress and a
direction to head in rather than a prescriptive checklist with which to comply . . . As the project
develops over time, the Board will consider how signatories can monitor and report on progress.76

However, rigorous oversight from the UNPRI governing board cannot be expected. The
governing board, a majority of whom are asset owners, are elected from within the asset
owner category of signatories. Yet, despite these shortcomings, the UNPRI have been
generally well received by the finance sector and civil societal institutions.77 In recent
years, many asset owners have signed up. Whether this enthusiasm will drive positive changes
in their behaviour is yet to be determined.

UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations

Another

international standard connected with the United Nations is the UN Norms on
the

Responsibilities

of

Transnational

Corporations

and Other Business

Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms).78 They apply to a range of
TNCs, including investment companies and other investment intermediaries. In
contrast to other instruments discussed in this article, the UN Norms are intended
to be legally binding if and when they are adopted by states. The UN Norms,
which formalize the types of demands originally made by developing countries at

the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations in the 1970s, mainly address
labour

standards

and

consumer

protection.79 They

also

contain

several

environmental provisions. They call upon TNCs to observe the precautionary
principle and to act ‘in a manner contributing to the wider goal of sustainable
development.’80 They go so far as to demand TNCs to respect a societal ‘right to a
clean and healthy environment.’81
The UN Norms contain several procedural requirements for their implementation.82
While they accommodate a role for the state,83 the UN Norms expect TNCs to ‘adopt,
disseminate and implement internal rules of operation’ and ‘to periodically report’84 on
their progress ‘to all relevant stakeholders.’85 Importantly, TNCs are further compelled to
‘apply and incorporate [the] Norms in their contracts or other arrangements and dealings’
with almost any and every party with whom they do business.86 Where their contracting
partners violate these terms, TNCs are required to ‘cease doing business with them.’87
Sanctions for non-compliance may include compensation that is determined by national
and/or international courts to affected persons and other entities.88 With these requirements,
the UN Norms seek in an unprecedented way to circumvent state authority and impose
international legal obligations directly on TNCs.

The

UN

Norms

thus

herald

a

radical

departure

from

previous

intergovernmental attempts to govern TNCs. Their most polarizing trait is
their imposition of obligations directly on corporations, in addition to
concomitant duties on states.89 This attribution attempts to overcome one of the
main governance gaps concerning TNCs, namely the fact that due to their
transnational nature, they often operate in a legal vacuum, particularly in states
that are themselves deeply mired in environmental and human rights abuses. Yet it
is an unorthodox approach in international law.

Many companies and their

associations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce, have criticized the
UN Norms for shifting the obligation to protect human rights and the environment

from governments to private companies.
These considerations have weighed on the UN Commission on Human Rights, which
declined

to

endorse

the

UN

Norms.90 A

report

by

John

Ruggie, UN special

representative on human rights and business, was critical of the form and reach of the UN
Norms and viewed the initiative as creating ‘confusion and doubt’ through ‘exaggerated
legal claims and conceptual ambiguities.’91 Even though the United Nations may never
formally adopt the UN Norms, some SRI institutions are beginning to refer to them in their
shareholder resolutions and proxy-voting guidelines.92 The Interfaith Center for Corporate
Responsibility, for example, which coordinates SRI among religious investors, has endorsed
the UN Norms.93 They would likely help bolster SRI by focusing on the environmental
behaviour of companies and those that finance them.
4. Collevecchio Declaration

Civil societal groups that are critical of facile, business-friendly codes of conduct
have offered financial institutions an alternative standard. In 2003 a coalition of
NGOs

drafted

the

Collevecchio

Declaration

on

Financial

Institutions

(Collevecchio Declaration),94 comprising six principles that stress accountability,
transparency, and stakeholder rights. Since groups outside of the financial sector
have prepared it, the Collevecchio Declaration presents itself as a more credible code.
On the other hand, this design is also a disadvantage since the declaration has little
buy-in from the financial sector. As of late 2007, approximately 100 organizations,
mostly NGOs, have endorsed the declaration.95 Very few endorsements have come
from financial institutions.
The Collevecchio Declaration requires financiers’ commitment to sustainability, ‘no
harm’

responsibility,

accountability,

transparency,

and

sustainable

markets

and

governance. The declaration differs from other normative standards through its more
rigorous and detailed requirements.
The ‘commitment to sustainability’ principle obliges investors to expand their missions from

ones that prioritize pro5t maximization to a vision of social and environmental sustainability. A
commitment to sustainability would require financial institutions to fully integrate the consideration
of

ecological limits, social equity and economic justice into corporate strategies and core

business areas (including credit, investing, underwriting, advising), to put sustainability objectives on
an equal footing to shareholder maximization and client satisfaction, and to actively strive to 5nance
transactions that promote sustainability.

Concomitantly, the declaration emphasizes precaution and the avoidance of harm rather than
merely the mitigation of impacts, as in some other codes. It also seeks to strengthen financiers’
accountability and transparency beyond the requirements of rival codes. On transparency,
for instance, it advises financial institutions to be ‘responsive to stakeholder needs for
specialized information’ and that ‘commercial confidentiality should not be used as an
excuse to deny stakeholders information.’
The declaration’s accompanying implementation document usefully elaborates these
principles and gives financiers specific guidance for promoting environmentally sound
financing. For example, concerning the commitment to transparency, it provides:
(a) Corporate Sustainability Reporting
Financial institutions should publish annual sustainability reports according to an internationally
recognized reporting format supported by civil society. Financial institutions should further include
disclosure on the sustainability profile of the financial institution’s portfolio, a breakdown of core
business activity by sector and

region, and the implementation of the financial institution’s

sustainability policies and objectives.

For now, these and other Collevecchio standards are possibly too demanding for
many banks and other financiers to accept. As the following section discusses, banks
have favoured the Equator Principles to manage their social and environmental
activities because this code was developed largely by the banking community itself
and gives lenders greater leeway and discretion.
1. Equator Principles
I I . PRO C E S S STA N DA R DS

A. Overview of the Standards

In the project finance market, the Equator Principles (EPs) provide lenders with a
framework to consider social and environmental issues.96 Project finance means loans for
specific projects such as highways, dams, factories, and other major economic investments
that often have a substantial ecological footprint. Formulated primarily by the banking
industry under the auspices of the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC),
the EPs target private, commercial lending in developing countries and emerging economies
where environmental regulation may be tenuous. While the EPs are categorized in this
article as being primarily process standards, they also include a normative framework
through their incorporation of the IFC’s performance standards.
The EPs arose from pressure from financial institutions such as the Calvert Group and Insight
Investment, as well as from demands from NGOs including the WWF and the FOE.97 The
financing of the Chad–Cameroon oil pipeline was the specific catalyst for such pressure.98
Fearing a volley of criticism if they supported this controversial project or the risk that
they would lose business to unscrupulous lenders if they insisted on strict environmental
safeguards, a cohort of banks sought a new level playing field for responsible project
financing. To boost the credibility of the proposed standards, the banks involved the IFC in
the process. The IFC is the World Bank’s private-sector lending arm, with extensive hands-on
experience with project finance, including the application of sustainability standards.

The EPs were finalized in June 2003 and revised in April 2006.99 The EPs are not
self-contained but incorporate reference to other standards, primarily the IFC’s
environmental and social performance, which address, inter alia, social and
environmental impact assessment (SEIA), natural resource conservation, indigenous
peoples, involuntary resettlement, labour, and so on. The EPs apply to projects with
a total capital cost of at least US $10 million (which was previously US $fi0 million).
The revised principles extend to upgrades or expansions of existing projects where
additional environmental or social impacts are significant. All signatories to the EPs
pledge to provide loans only to borrowers who conform to the principles.

The EPs initially require lenders to rate projects that they plan to finance based on the
magnitude of potential impacts and risks in accordance with the screening criteria of the
IFC.100 These criteria categorize projects as A, B, or C (high, medium, and low), depending
on the potential environmental and social impact of the project. For A and B projects, the
borrower must undertake a SEIA based on IFC standards to address issues identified in the
screening process. Project-financing banks must also prepare an action plan based on the
conclusions of the SEIA.101 For category C projects, which are of lesser impact, no further
assessment is required beyond the initial screening.
For all category A and B projects, lenders must ensure that the borrower has consulted ‘in
a structured and culturally appropriate manner.’102 The SEIA report and action plan must be
publicly available in a local language for a reasonable period to allow for public comment.
These documents are also subject to independent expert review.103 The borrower must also
establish a ‘grievance mechanism’ to allow it to ‘receive and facilitate resolution of concerns
and grievances about the project’s social and environmental performance raised by
individuals or groups from among project-affected communities.’104 Prior to drawing on the
loan, the borrower must covenant with the lender to (1) comply with the environmental
management plan in the construction and operation of the project; (2) provide regular reports
on compliance with the plan; and (3) where applicable, decommission facilities in accordance
with an agreed plan.105

B. Response of the Banking Community

Given the banking community’s heavy involvement in the actual design of the EPs,
it is not surprising that banks have generally welcomed the principles. As of June
2007, approximately fifty banks and related financial institutions had pledged
themselves to the principles, accounting for over 80 per cent of the global project
financing market.106 Most of the signatories are North American or western European
banks. A study by the British law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer concluded

that the EPs ‘impact on the financial market generally and their success in
redefining banking considerations has been far greater than anyone could have
predicted.’107
The EPs have appealed to banks for several reasons, including the fact that they counter
stakeholder and NGO activism, protect market share, maintain a level business playing
field, incorporate voluntary standards, and minimize financial risks.108 For some lenders,
subscription to the EPs offers public relations benefits to counter increasing NGO scrutiny of
their environmental and social behaviour.109 For instance, following a 2005 shareholder
proposal filed to the Bank of Montreal by the Ethical Funds Company, the resolution was
withdrawn after the bank agreed to adhere to the EPs.110 Similarly, the Rainforest Action
Network was particularly successful in its global finance campaign to get Citigroup, the
world’s largest bank, to change its policies to avoid destructive investment in endangered
ecosystems.111

C. Implementation of the EPs
The 2006 revisions to the EPs have improved their accountability, transparency, and
enforceability, although not to the satisfaction of all critics.112 Significantly, a lender’s
categorization of a project or the scope of an environmental impact assessment (EIA) or
management plan cannot readily be challenged. The categorization of a project is crucial
for it influences the types of environmental standards and procedures that would
subsequently apply. Normally, environmental legislation would allow interested persons to
review and challenge such a threshold decision. While affected groups may comment
publicly on a SEIA or a proposed management plan, they do not have the legal rights to
challenge such plans, since EPs are voluntary and therefore do not make this provision.
Moreover, the language of the principles is vague. For example, the assessment of projects
need only ‘refer to’ the IFC standards.

The EPs, however, require the lender to appoint an independent environmental
expert to monitor all category A projects and, ‘as appropriate,’ all category B

projects.113 Further, ‘at least annually,’ the lender must disclose to the public its
‘implementation

processes

and experience,

taking into account appropriate

confidentiality considerations.’114 While these measures should help to illuminate
lenders’

implementation

efforts,

the EPs lack a supporting secretariat to

coordinate oversight. BankTrack, an

umbrella

organization

of

NGOs,

has

relentlessly criticized the Equator banks. Its 2005 review of the principles (before
revisions) concluded that the majority of lenders provided only limited reporting of
their implementation of the EPs.115 BankTrack also found some hesitancy among
Equator banks to disclose the details (for example, names, locations, facilities) of
projects that they had financed or declined.116 Most recently, in May 2007,
BankTrack raised concerns about the growing role of Chinese banks in project
lending and their failure to commit to responsible financing.117 On the other hand, a
report by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer more optimistically suggested that the
principles have led some Equator banks ‘into more structured dialogue with
stakeholders and NGOs about social and environmental aspects of their lending.’118
On enforceability, the EPs disclaim that they confer ‘any rights in, or liability to, any
person.’ Thus, the Equator banks do not see the Principle 6 grievance mechanism as a
formal dispute resolution system that can confer obligations or liabilities against them.
Further, while borrowers must adhere to environmental covenants included in the loan
agreement, lenders themselves are not contractually bound to comply with the EPs or to
enforce them against their borrowers. Theoretically, shareholders of a publicly listed Equator
bank might contend that they have relied on their bank’s public statements that it abides by the
EPs. In some jurisdictions, this false communication would enable shareholder suits where
the bank’s reputation (and, therefore, the business and shareholder value) has suffered because
of a failure to implement the EPs.119

Evidence so far suggests that implementation of the principles has been patchy.

Some projects appear to have been rejected for incompatibility with EP standards,
while other sources point to Equator banks still funding unsustainable projects.120 The
banks’ own corporate sustainability reports shed some insight. Barclays Bank, for
example, discloses in its glossy Corporate Responsibility Report 2005 that it
considered fifty highand medium-risk projects and declined twenty-two.121 Other
factors besides environmental concerns have no doubt played a part here. HSBC
boasts that in 2005 it rejected seven projects of sixty-seven that it reviewed for
compliance with the EPs.122
Several major, international infrastructure projects have tested the credibility of the EPs.
One is the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline running through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Turkey to bring Caspian Sea oil to the West.123 According to BankTrack, this project, which
was funded by a consortium of financiers including some Equator banks, violates the EPs
in regard to protection of indigenous peoples and ecologically sensitive terrain. However,
the pipeline development consortium has in many respects applied the EPs openly. They
created a publicly accessible website,124 where anyone can consult environmental assessments
and related documents, many of which are published in local languages. The BTC case
shows that an Equator bank may be fully in conformity with decision-making procedures laid
down by the principles yet, ultimately, still fund a development that many see as being
unsustainable.
Another controversial project testing the credibility of the EPs is the Uruguayan pulp
mills proposed near the Rio Uruguay, bordering Uruguay and Argentina. The mills, which
pose many environmental hazards, have engendered much dispute between the countries
including litigation in the International Court of Justice.125 In November 2006 the IFC
approved a $170 million investment in the Orion pulp mill, one of the two mills, the
majority of which is owned by Finnish company Oy Metsä-Botnia Ab.126 IFC endorsement
has made it easier to garner private lenders for the Uruguay pulp mills, although some
Equator banks have declined.127 The NGO community and Argentina itself remain deeply

concerned. A report on Financing Pulp Mills by the Center for International Forestry
Research, contends that the SEIA submitted by Oy Metsä-Botnia Ab ‘falls far short of what a
proper assessment of the mill should consider.’128 It also faulted an assessment process that
began after the projects were well advanced.
Given the structure of project financing, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect the EPs to
revolutionize lending practices. In developed country markets, major projects usually
require an EIA to be prepared in order to obtain relevant approvals for undertaking the
project. Consequently, the application of the EPs would not significantly increase
compliance costs or burdens faced by project sponsors or borrowers except perhaps in
subtle ways, such as the extent of public consultation. In emerging markets, which is the
intended domain for the EPs, environmental assessments are often not routine, and,
consequently, the principles may create additional compliance costs for lenders. Project
financers, however, have other reasons to take notice of environmental issues, including
reputational risks or financial hardship for borrowers repaying a pollution fine.129 Even when
a bank has sufficient motivation, its potential leverage over a borrower can be limited
because banks often do not get involved in a financing deal until after the basic project
choices and design decisions have already been made.130 Further, determined would-be
borrowers have ways to circumvent an Equator bank’s demands, such as by self-financing a
project using shareholder funds or the bond market.131 This fact points to the need for more
comprehensive solutions to promote SRI throughout financial markets rather than merely
within the project finance context.
2. Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
The GRI, which was launched by CERES and UNEP in 1997, is a multi-stakeholder
process creating an internationally applicable framework for reporting on sustainability
issues.132 The GRI furnishes reporting principles

and specific indicators to guide

sustainability reporting for companies and

organizations.

other

GRI

Sustainability

Reporting Guidelines (known as G-3, being the third generation of guidelines) were issued
in 2006.133 They consist of reporting principles, reporting guidance, and standard

disclosures.

The

reporting

principles

are

materiality,

stakeholder

inclusiveness,

sustainability context, and completeness.

Appreciating the limits of a homogeneous reporting framework, the GRI
has

created sector-specific supplements. The financial

sector supplement

focuses on unique environmental impacts associated with financial services
and products. 134 Reporting standards use thirteen environmental performance
indicators, such as ‘description of process[es] for assessing and screening
environmental risks in core business lines’ and ‘description of voting policy on
environmental issues for shares over which the reporting organisation holds the
right to vote shares or advise on voting.’135 The governance structure of the GRI
has enabled a broad range of stakeholders to influence the reporting guidelines
and is thus reflective of their concerns and objectives. The consensus-making
approach increases the GRI’s legitimacy and applicability. On the other hand, the
GRI is not a management tool. It guides non-financial reporting and must be
complemented by a separate corporate environmental management system
(EMS).
The GRI has become the dominant standard for non-financial reporting. A 2005
KMPG analysis of corporate reporting trends found changes in both the style and
scale of environmental reports.136 First, the focus of reporting has evolved from
mainly purely environmental reporting until the late 1990s to sustainability (social,
environmental, and economic) reporting, reflective of changes to the GRI guidelines
themselves. Second, on the scale of changes, KMPG found that sustainability
reporting has become more mainstream among the majority of large companies
surveyed.137 Of the respondents interviewed, 40 per cent noted that the GRI was
determinative of the content of their company’s sustainability report.138 Other
studies have verified the increasing status of the GRI guidelines.139 The SRI

community has sought to promote use of the GRI among financial institutions.140
However, the quality of GRI reporting by some financial institutions has been
disappointing. Many simply report on their direct, in-house activities rather than the
broader environmental risks and impacts of their clients and borrowers.141

1. ISO 14000 Series
I V. MANAGEM EN T SYST EMS

Like reporting mechanisms, EMSs help financial institutions to assess their own or their
clients’ environmental performance.142 An EMS is a group of standards and processes that
organizations may adopt to improve their internal use of materials and energy and a
structure for organizations to identify, appraise, and minimize their environmental risks.
An EMS can help a business make production cost savings and gain a better market
reputation.143 Several internationally applicable EMSs can aid SRI.144 The most important
are the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) 14000 series145 and the EU’s
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS).146
The ISO, which is an umbrella organization for a network of national standards
institutes from over 1fi0 countries, has produced numerous technical standards to facilitate
technology exchange and trade.147 Its first EMS was the ISO 14000 series, encompassing
management system principles, environmental auditing, and life cycle assessment. There is
no official ISO standard for the financial services sector as such. All of the ISO 14000 series
take the form of ‘guidance,’ with the exception of the ISO 14001, which is a certificated
standard.148 It requires participating organizations to develop an environmental policy
statement; a corporate plan to achieve environmental goals and comply with legislation;
and a monitoring system. The aim is a process by which businesses may reflexively learn to
identify and eliminate environmentally damaging activities.149 Yet, while ISO compliance
indicates the existence of management controls, it does not signify an absolute level of
performance.

The ISO has decided to develop a new voluntary standard on corporate social

responsibility that may prove particularly beneficial for SRI. The guidance standard
will be published in 2008 as ISO 26000.150 It will not, however, include specific
requirements and will thus not be a certification standard like the ISO 14001. The
financial sector is taking a growing interest in ISO 14001 both for itself and its
clients.151 Banks have been most interested, and, in 1999, the UBS (a Swiss bank)
was the first lender to be certified.152 The Credit Suisse Group, which also has ISO
14001 certification, has spoken of its advantages: ‘[B]eing certified improves the
marketing of the green and ethical funds we offer to our institutional and retail
customers.’153 In asset selection, Credit Suisse explains ‘it is much easier to select
stocks of ISO 14001-certified companies for a green and/or ethical fund.’154 And it
believes that ‘having a certified EMS speeds up risk assessment because all relevant
environmental data is already available or quickly obtained.’155
2. Eco-Management Audit Scheme (EMAS)
The EMAS differs from ISO 14000 by seeking continuous performance improvements
and public disclosure of environmental auditing findings.156 Participating organizations
voluntarily agree to install an EMS (usually for

discrete physical sites) and prepare

performance reports for verification by a certified environmental auditor at least once every
three years. Those that achieve the performance standards can market an approved emblem in
their

advertisements and promotions.157 The organizations must also formulate

an

environmental policy statement for verification by an independent auditor, which is also
made available to the public. The EMAS is considered a good example of a reflexive
environmental law since it encourages awareness raising and the disclosure of environmental
impacts within industry.158

The EMAS was amended in 2001 to broaden its scope to, inter alia, financial
services.159 Previously, the EMAS was structured around discrete physical sites rather
than organizations per se, such as the whole operations of a company. Before 2001,
countries could only extend the EMAS provisions to the service sector on an

experimental basis,160 as Austria and Germany did so for banking and insurance
industries.161 The new focus is on the organization itself not on its physical location.
This change was crucial for the EMAS to encompass the financial sector. Further,
under Annex VI of the EMAS, an organization can only be certified if it
considers

all

environmental

environmental aspects’

aspects

of

its

activities,

including

‘indirect

arising from ‘capital investments, granting loans and

insurance services.’162 This change is seminal because a financial organization’s
direct ecological footprint (for example, its energy use and waste) is markedly
lower than the impact of its borrowers and customers, which are much more
pervasive. However, promotional material for the financial sector suggests that the
EMAS remains targeted primarily at the direct ecological footprint of financiers’
activities, including consumers of resources such as paper and energy and
extending to their supply chains.163 Financial institutions that are EMAS certified
include UniCredito Italiano and Oesterreichische Nationalbank.
3. Potential of the EMS

By summarizing environmental performance data, EMSs can help financiers
efficiently assess the risks posed by clients. Insurance markets were the first sector
to acknowledge firms’ accreditation to EMSs.164 Significant

discounts

environmental

to

liability

insurance

premiums

were

offered

on

chemical

manufacturers that subscribed to the Responsible Care EMS.165 Some banks offer
finance on preferential terms to EMS-certified borrowers.166 Davies suggests: ‘[B]y
looking for [EMS] registration in loan applications, banks can determine several facts
relevant to the health of their loan portfolios.’167 Yet because EMSs tend to look at
existing rather than future environmental performance, they must usually be
supplemented with regular verification to retain their validity.
While the propagation of corporate EMSs provides a welcome framework for reflexive

management and environmental self-organization, the approach has some limitations.168 From a
regulatory perspective, EMSs may be unsatisfactory to the extent that they favour private over
public interests.169 Nor can free-riding third parties be forced to comply given the voluntary
nature of the process, unless governments legislate minimum environmental standards and
offer inducements to companies. Furthermore, EMSs are essentially procedural, requiring
that companies have a system for managing environmental issues. The substantive goals
that a company selects as the basis of its EMS may be facile so that it can achieve the desired
standards at little inconvenience.170 Greater involvement of environmental NGOs in the
design of EMS standards may help make them more publicly acceptable and take firms beyond
business as usual.171

V.

COM PA R AT I V E EVA LUAT ION MECH A N ISMS

1. Sustainability Indexes
A. Function and Structure of Sustainability Indexes
Sustainability indexes are a relatively new SRI governance tool to assess and compare the
social and environmental performance of public companies. A sustainability index is a special
type of market index. A market index tracks price movements of listed financial securities
within it. By comparing market values of selected companies over time, a graph can be
constructed to show changes in their value. A sustainability index is distinctive as it only
includes firms that meet specified environmental and social criteria, in addition to
demonstrating financial robustness. Each index has its own criteria for inclusion and
methods for collecting data on companies’ performance. Official stock exchanges and
private SRI research institutions have both established sustainability indexes, as detailed in
Table 2.

The criteria and rules that govern inclusion in each index help to improve the
integrity of the SRI market in three crucial ways. First, the methodologies to
select and rank companies constitute a normative benchmark for the whole SRI
market including companies not formally included in any index. Second, they

provide sustainability benchmarks against which

to compare performance.

Responsible investors may rely on such indexes, as both a benchmark to compare
the progress of their SRI portfolio to the sustainability index and as a means of
picking assets that comply with the investor’s preferred environmental and social
criteria. Third, the ultimate membership selections of the SRI indexes constitute an
instrument of market ordering. Companies that seek competitive advantages from
association with a prestigious sustainability index are disciplined to adhere to the
index criteria of membership. Each index helps communicate the standards of social
investors

to

corporations

in

an

understandable

format.

Together,

these

characteristics make sustainability market indexes a unique enforcement mechanism
for corporate governance standards since removal of a company from an index
focuses the attention of owners as well as management in a way that bad publicity
or condemnation by an institutional investor is unlikely to accomplish alone.

Each sustainability index only includes companies sourced from a specific investment
universe, such as European or US equities. Most indexes also cap the number of
constituents, so if one company is excluded it is replaced immediately with another. The
Dow Jones specialist SRI indexes have between 100 and 2fi0 companies each.172 Companies,

of course, must have publicly traded stocks to be eligible for inclusion in an index. This
mandate excludes some socially responsible companies that are not public firms (for
example, Ikea).
The following sections look in detail at the two main sustainability indexes—the
Dow Jones Sustainability Group Indexes and the Financial Times Stock Exchange
(FTSE)4Good

Index

Series.

These

indexes

are the most significant since their

connections to major international stock exchanges in New York and London have given
each a profile and level of market influence unobtainable by rival SRI indexes. Both
indexes now include many financial institutions, mainly banks and investment firms that
take the form of public corporations.173 They also have set benchmarks for some other
SRI

indexes

such

as

Australia’s

Sustainable

Assessment

Management

(SAM)

Sustainability Index.174

B. Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSIs)

The DJSIs were launched in 1999 to track the financial performance of the
leading CSR-driven companies worldwide.175 The first index created in this
family, the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index, comprises over 300 companies
that represent, using Dow Jones criteria, the top 10 per cent of the leading
sustainability companies drawn from the Dow Jones Global Indexes. Other indexes
added to the family include the Dow Jones Sustainability North American Index, the
Dow Jones Sustainability United States Index, and the Dow Jones Sustainability
European Index.176
All indexes of the DJSI family are constructed according to the same CSR criteria, which
include general and industry-specific criteria, covering three

areas:

environmental,

economic, and social performance.177 The Swiss-based SAM makes the evaluations. Using
a business case model of CSR, the SAM looks at how corporate sustainability
performance creates both financial risks and opportunities. It thus provides a ‘financial

quantification of corporate sustainability performance.’178
The general SAM assessment criteria include corporate governance,
management and performance, human rights, supply chain

environmental

management, and labour

practices. This information is assimilated and verified to give each company an overall
‘corporate sustainability score.’ This score enables identification of leading sustainability
companies in each sector. Negative screens are also applied to the DJSI World to create
subset indexes that exclude companies involved in the production of tobacco, alcohol,
gambling, armaments, and firearms.
Information about corporate social, economic, and environmental performance is
gathered from disparate sources including general industry questionnaires, corporate
documents and reports, media commentary and stakeholder reports, and direct contacts
with companies.179 While the criteria and methodology behind the index is publicly
available, the data collected by SAM analysts for determining the composition of each
DJSI is not disclosed publicly. Independent studies, though, have found that DJSI World
companies perform strongly on CSR indicators.180

To maintain the integrity of each index, a ‘corporate sustainability monitoring’
system applies ‘to verify a company’s involvement and management of critical
environmental, economic and social crisis situations that can have a highly
damaging effect on its reputation.’181 The monitoring system can lead to a firm’s
exclusion from the DJSI. Further, each DJSI is reviewed annually and quarterly to
ensure that the index composition accurately reflects the top tier of leading
sustainability companies within the DJSI investable universe.182

The Design and Advisory Committees are critical to the DJSI governance. The former
comprises two representatives from each of the DGSI and the SAM Group. This committee is
responsible for auditing the index composition at annual and quarterly reviews, completing an
ongoing review of all extraordinary corporate actions for possible changes to index

composition, verifying the integrity of market data, and, ultimately, deciding on the
composition of the index. The DJSI Advisory Committee has ten independent financial
sector advisors and CSR experts. Its primary mandate is ‘to give advice on possible
implications for sustainability-driven portfolio management and offer input regarding the
methodology.’183

C. FTSE4Good Index Series
The FTSE4Good Index Series was launched in July 2001 with the intention of raising funds
for UNICEF by donating licensing fees from the index to support UNICEF programmes for
children. By 2007 the FTSE4Good had grown to a family of five indexes covering global
and major regional markets.184 They function under the auspices of the FTSE, which is
based in London. The FTSE4Good indexes are derived from the parent FTSE All-Share
Index (United Kingdom) or the FTSE Developed Index (Global). Unlike the DJSI, the
FTSE4Good indexes are not about recognizing ‘best practice’ companies. Rather, they set
specific standards for companies to meet if they wish to be included in the index. The
FTSE4Good also differs from the DJSI in that it has a policy of active engagement and
dialogue with companies. It is much more proactive than other SRI index providers in
pushing companies to improve their sustainability performance.185

The FTSE4Good uses a mix of positive and negative screens, and the criteria are
progressively tightened over time, such as new climate change standards.186 Screens
include companies that satisfy requirements in five areas: the environment, climate
change, human rights, supply chain labour standards, and countering bribery.
Conversely, companies connected to tobacco, nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, or
uranium mining are excluded. The FTSE4Good Policy Committee intends to
eventually replace these exclusion criteria with performance-based criteria.
The FTSE4Good team has devised detailed criteria to define three dimensions of
sustainability.187 Environmental criteria assign companies with a low, medium, or high

impact weighting according to their industry sector. Higher impact sectors incur more
stringent index inclusion criteria. These criteria cover corporate environmental policy,
management systems, and reporting practices. For example, while a company in a high
impact sector must adopt a formal EMS, a company in a low impact sector need not.188
Further, high impact companies must regularly publish a report on their environmental
policies and practices, unlike lower impact sector companies.
Like the DJSI, the FTSE4Good retains an SRI consultancy group, the

Ethical

Investment Research Service (EIRIS), to assess companies according to the FTSE4Good
criteria. EIRIS relies on company questionnaires, direct contact, and company reports for
its evaluations. A specialist FTSE committee retains ultimate responsibility for decisions to
include or remove a company from the indexes. The FTSE4Good Policy Committee, whose
membership is drawn from corporations, academia, NGOs, and the financial sector, reviews
the FTSE4Good indexes semi-annually. It also oversees the development and approval of
criteria revisions or new criteria to the indexes.
The FTSE4Good indexes are influential because they are used as a basis for regional and
global SRI index tracker funds and for asset selection by actively managed investment
portfolios. According to the FTSE, its SRI indexes help ‘investors to navigate through the
plethora of corporate social responsibility (CSR) codes and standards around the world.’189 A
2004 study of the FTSE4Good’s impact on corporate behaviour suggests that it has had some
impact on the internal operations of listed companies, especially on their reporting, policy
decisions, and management systems.190
2. SRI Research and Advocacy Bodies
A significant facet of the new transnational governance of SRI is the global network of
SRI think tanks, namely research, consultancy, and advocacy bodies. This plethora of
financial sector and civil society institutions, which are detailed in Table 3, contribute to
sharing information, raising awareness, building consensus for action, disseminating best
practice examples, and encouraging policy advocacy. They assist governance through the
evaluation and ranking of corporate social and environmental performance, surveys of SRI

market trends, and the facilitation of information about the SRI sector generally through
conferences, websites, and reports.The most valuable governance function formed by these
institutions is the evaluation and rating of corporate social and environmental performance
for investors. This work contributes to SRI norm building in several ways. The process by
which companies collect and respond to questionnaires, surveys, and other information
requests may help them to reflect upon their social and environmental performance,
possibly with a view to making organizational and policy changes.191 Some of these SRI
research institutions have lobbied and pressured governments for reforms. For instance,
Canada’s Social Investment Organization has campaigned for amendments to Canadian
pensions fund legislation in order to require disclosure of SRI policies.192 The SRI research
and advocacy community has also critically influenced important governance questions,
such as what should qualify as SRI. Table 3 lists some principal SRI associations.

Monitoring the financiers’ observance of SRI standards and exerting pressure for

improved compliance is another function played by these bodies and other NGOs.
Broad-based environmental NGOs are increasingly scrutinizing the environmental
impacts of financiers.193 Some specialize in just the financial sector, such as
BankTrack,194 which monitors compliance with the Equator Principles. Apart from
these civil societal institutions, market players such as associations of institutional
investors have also collaborated to address SRI issues. These include the
Canadian

Coalition

of

Good

Governance,195 the

Council

of

Institutional

Investors,196 and the International Corporate Governance Network.197 Several investor
coalitions have formed subsidiary groups targeting specific SRI concerns. To
address climate change risk, for example, investors have set up the Carbon
Disclosure Project,198 which gathers information necessary for investors to assess
the financial risks posed by climate change; the Institutional Investor Summits on
Climate Risk,199 which provides investors with a comprehensive analysis of the
financial risks associated with climate change; the Institutional Investors Group on
Climate Change,200 which exchanges information about the material risks to, and
opportunities for, businesses associated with climate change; and the Investor
Network on Climate Risk, which addresses financial risk implications.201
Another facet is the specialist consultancy organizations, which provide SRI advice and
research to investors. These include Mercer Management

Consulting,202 Innovest,203

Enhanced Analytics Initiative,204 and KLD Research and Analytics.205 They evaluate
corporate environmental performance, research the state of the SRI market, and provide
management tools to investors wishing to integrate environmental, social, and governance
factors into their financial decisions.

VI.

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding commentary highlights that different governance mechanisms play
different roles. These include providing normative frameworks, process standards,

management systems, and comparative evaluation. Normative frameworks furnish
guidance on best practices and acceptable performance. Process guidelines enable
an organization’s performance to be
assessed, verified, and communicated. Management systems guide the integration of corporate
codes of conduct in strategic and day-to-day corporate management. Comparative evaluation
mechanisms serve to evaluate and rank businesses collectively to assist asset selection by
SRI institutions.
Are the fragmented norms and institutions of the current smorgasbord of transnational
governance the most effective way to achieve a more sustainable society through the
financial sector? Or do they merely tinker with the problem of irresponsible financing and
thereby mask the continuation of business as usual? Certainly, the answer to these
questions depends partly on available alternatives. Despite international agreements to
liberalize financial services, governments retain ample authority to regulate at a national
and international level the environmental impacts of investment. For instance, the General
Agreement on Trade and Services in regard to financial services includes a so-called
‘prudential carve-out,’ which allows states to enact public interest regulation to control
unwelcome side effects of financial markets.206 However, governments have declined to use
the prudential carve-out power to address environmental and social problems. Nor have they
been willing to collaborate to enact international financial agreements that would impose
substantive standards for ethical and responsible financing. This lacuna in hard law—in
both the national and international spheres—has thus been left to soft law standards to fill.
With any voluntary governance mechanism, the recurrent criticism is that they amount to
‘greenwash’—a smokescreen to placate critics and enable companies to continue largely as
usual.207 Given the context of a neo-liberal capitalist system, some NGOs and commentators
see the Equator Principles and other SRI governance mechanisms as being incapable of
achieving sustainability.208 In this perspective, SRI remains a niche market functioning
within a financial sector that is unwilling to address social and environmental constraints and a
system of regulation that does not favour social control over capital allocation.

Thus, perhaps SRI can only promote meaningful change if it is nested within a
governance system that includes more rigorous controls such as mandatory
corporate sustainability reporting, fully cost-internalizing environmental taxes and
liability rules, the democratization of financial institution governance, and greater
state involvement in capital allocation such as through national pension plans, which
is starting to occur in Sweden and New Zealand.209 Given the complexity and
intrusiveness of such measures, they would most likely be adopted through nationallevel regulation rather than through international agreements, at present.
As the emerging SRI governance mechanisms are prone to subversion by the very market
forces that they are meant to govern, how can we maintain their integrity? One reason for
hope is that the very fragmented and disparate nature of these mechanisms, which span
numerous codes of conduct, indexes, reporting standards, and research associations, may
help minimize the risk of the entire realm being colonized or co-opted. The global network of
environmental and social NGOs will also play a role in keeping pressure on the financial
sector.
The behavioural impact of SRI transnational governance mechanisms lacks thorough
empirical verification. This article has suggested changes in policies and behaviour of
financial institutions. Many banks and investors have subscribed to codes of conduct, issued
policy statements, established new organizational units, and changed their environmental risk
assessment procedures. However, the impact of these changing SRI norms on the companies
that they finance is much harder to determine. Given the difficulty of isolating the impact
of specific variables, it is only possible to draw contingent and provisional conclusions
about the impact of changes in SRI governance.
It is clear that, although SRI governance has global ambitions, the financial institutions that
have thus far committed themselves to SRI standards are overwhelmingly from Western
Europe and, to a lesser extent, from North America and Oceania. These are regions
characterized by relatively high levels of political and civil rights, mature markets, and active

civil society organizations. Conversely, countries without these conditions remove a major
impetus for adopting a code of conduct. Thus, corporate policies and strategies are more
likely to address environmental issues when demanded or induced by the institutional
context of a particular company. Corporate adherences to SRI codes serve what some
commentators have described as part of their ‘social license’ to operate.210

Another key observation is that financial institutions specializing in those services or
functions with the most visibility, and with the greatest involvement in the design of a
code, are most likely to adopt it. To illustrate, among the top twenty international
arrangers of project finance loans, 60 per cent have signed the EPs. The EPs were
developed by the banking industry, and this fact has created advantages in having
the principles designed by people knowledgeable about project finance and the sense
of ownership that the banking industry felt about the process. The corresponding
numbers for other services or functions of lower public visibility (or those that have
environmental and social impacts that are less directly traceable) are global fund
managers (3fi per cent) and global financial advisers (30 per cent).211 Reputational
risk appears to drive an adherence to SRI norms.
If we accept that only voluntary standards and codes are likely to be tolerated by
financial markets and international policy makers in the near future, what improvements to
them can we realistically expect? Three areas of reform need investigation. First, should the
plethora of standards be harmonized into one or two main governance frameworks? The
complexity and institutional diversity of financial markets, where financiers pursue different
roles, are one reason to favour the continued evolution of sector and function-specific
governance mechanisms. And, as noted earlier, the diversity of standards also protects
against subversion by hostile market forces. On the other hand, some consolidation of
governance tools could decrease

confusion as well as the implementation costs for

organizations.

A second topic for reform is to bolster the enforcement side of these voluntary

mechanisms. Market institutions such as stock exchanges could be harnessed as
surrogate regulators. For instance, we could go beyond sustainability indexes to
require that each company meet environmental standards as a condition of being
listed on a stock. For codes of conduct such as the Equator Principles and the UN
statements, we must expand the role of the public in monitoring and enforcing
these norms. Financiers should be accountable not only to their shareholders and
other supporters but also to the communities whose livelihoods are affected by the
projects they finance. Creating mechanisms for community accountability such as
the World Bank Inspection Panel or the IFC’s Office of the Compliance
Advisor/Ombudsman should be a priority for the SRI codes.212 A useful feature of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises is the system of ‘national contact points’ in the
participating countries to hear complaints from the public concerning company
non-compliance with the guidelines.213 While this mechanism has not always
brought justice, such as the recent case involving a complaint against Australia’s
ANZ bank financing forestry operations in Papua New Guinea, it has the potential
to do more.214
Third, SRI governance tools are primarily informational policy instruments. They serve
to communicate, evaluate, and rank corporate environmental performance for interested
responsible investors. Not only does such information feed the ethical concerns of investors,
but it may also affect the market value of businesses by disclosing liabilities and other
factors that affect earnings and profitability.215 However, it would be useful to see some
direct financial incentives offered to stimulate SRI. For example, governments could offer
tax concessions to SRI organizations, which would be carried out in the context of
approved SRI codes of conduct.
This article thus gives cautious and highly qualified endorsement to the new transnational

SRI governance. Lamentably, it falls short of what is needed to truly reorient capital
markets towards social justice and environmental protection. Yet the limitations of alternate
routes to international

environmental regulation must be acknowledged. It has been

governments’ inability or unwillingness to regulate financial institutions and corporate
conduct effectively that has prompted civil society and some responsible investors to take
the lead. When governments fail to agree to regulate international financial markets, the
advantages of the current potpourri of instruments become even more apparent. They help
to overcome the shortcomings of global politics where agreement on inter-governmental
policies and regulations can take years to happen, if at all. However, we should not be
resigned to accepting this situation as the best we can achieve. The environmental crisis
engulfing us demands ongoing pressure for better methods of governance for sustainability.
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